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Indonesia’s Tax Amnesty potentially will increase state tax revenues in rupiah; 
however, it cannot increase tax compliance as measured by the tax ratio value. Tax 
audit as a law enforcement needs to be carried out on taxpayers with high risk in 
utilizing tax amnesty policies for tax avoidance. By comparing the ratio of tax payment 
revenue (TPR) in manufacturing companies listed on IDX, this study finds that most of 
the samples are indicated to have a high risk of tax avoidance, since the value of TPR 
is significantly lower when the tax amnesty is enacted, compared to that prior to the 
enactment. To determine which taxpayers are doing illegal tax avoidance and need to 
be audited, further analysis is necessary for those with significant TPR reduction, one 
of which is by analyzing the financial ratios. This method is possibly used for each 
industry due to its different characteristics. It facilitates both the tax authority to 
increase taxpayer compliance and the taxpayer to make tax planning. 
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If the market mechanism is purely applied, it will not be efficient since economic agents 
have to look for prices every day. This will be challenging and causes transaction costs 
(Coase, 1937). To overcome this condition, Coase (1937) proposed the theory of the 
firm. A firm interacts with the market and determines agreed price. A long-term contract 
is made to facilitate the pricing. The establishment of the company forms the long-term 
contracts amongst the firm and the main customers and suppliers. The existence of the 
company also makes the government willing to become the company's main customer. 
Major customers and suppliers will influence management in carrying out company 
operations to maximize profits such as carrying out tax planning strategies (Huang, 
Lobo, Wang, & Xie, 2016). 
 
The behavioral theory by Richard M. Cyert and James G. March in their book ‘A 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm’ and published in 1963, deals with how companies 
behave in the market and what determines the relationships amongst companies 
(Todeva, 2007). To ensure the management work optimally, incentives are needed as 
a tool to influence the management to make rational decisions (Kraaijenbrink & 
Spender, 2014), such as a tax planning strategy for tax reductions. In addition, there is 
important that the management is able work comfortably and has the motivation to 
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increase the performance (Ashraff, et al., 2020). The management is suggested to 
provide the conducive working environment (Muniandy et al., 2020). This condition will 
affect the company's relationship with the government that has an interest in income 
tax revenues. 
 
To create corporate value with the management decisions, stakeholder theory 
assumes that companies must be able to align and synthesize the interests of all 
stakeholders involved in the company (Kraaijenbrink & Spender, 2014). If the 
stakeholders feel that their interests are not aligned with the results of the management 
decisions, they will come to decisions for their interests. One of the stakeholders is the 
government that has need of tax amnesty policy due to reduced income tax revenues. 
Unless the implementation of the tax amnesty policy is satisfying, the government 
issues another policy, such as an audit policy to ensure that the tax amnesty policy 
goes to its expectation (Alm & Beck, 1993). Directorate General of Taxes (DGT), as a 
tax authority in Indonesia, has issued the audit policy out of the tax amnesty policy. 
 
Tax Amnesty  
Indonesian government needs revenues, particularly from taxes, since more than 80% 
of its revenues are derived from taxes. One of the regulations to increase the tax 
revenues in short term is the tax amnesty policy. By applying this policy, taxpayers’ 
compliance is expected to increase, especially for those with tax avoidance schema. 
They will continually pay taxes if the program is applied in the future.  
 
The policy has been enacted from 1 July 2016 until 31 March 2017 and was divided 
into three periods. It gives taxpayers the opportunity to declare assets that have not 
been reported in annual tax returns by paying different penalties for the tax amnesty 
participants. They depend on periods, locations of declared assets, and taxpayer 
characters. The penalties of the early period are lower than those of the next period. It 
results in increasing the income tax revenues as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Income Tax Revenue and Tax Ratio 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 














Tax Ratio1 11.91 11.86 11.36 10.70 10.80 10.70 
Sources:  
1. Central Bureau of Statistics (2019). 
2. Tax ratio from Information of APBN 2017, 2018, and 2019, Directorate General of 
Budget, Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia. 
 
Data in Table 1 indicate that the tax amnesty policy in Indonesia is unable to increase 
the taxpayers’ compliance in the short term. According to the tax amnesty policy in 
Chicago, USA, the policy cannot increase the taxpayers’ compliance, neither in short 
term nor in long term (Alm & Beck, 1993). Alm & Beck (1993) suggested that there is a 
greater law enforcement such as tax audit than what has been done so far. DGT is 
expected to intensify tax audits based on taxpayers behavior in such a way that there 
 
1 Tax ratio is the ratio of all taxes revenues by a government to gross domestic product.  
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is a sense of closeness, cooperation, loyalty, and compliance from the taxpayers 
toward DGT (Ruiz et al., 2020). 
 
Although the income tax revenues decreased in 2017 compared to those in 2016, the 
tax amnesty has reached the government’s tax revenue target growth mainly in rupiah 
or in currency. Unfortunately, the tax amnesty policy cannot achieve the revenues 
target in tax ratio (12.2% for 2016 and 10.9% for 2017)2. The ratio trend is to decline.  
 
In reality, the application of tax amnesty policy is voluntary. However, more severe 
sanctions will be imposed to those incompletely declare their tax assets during the tax 
amnesty. Participating in the tax amnesty, previous tax debts are annulled. It is a 
popular government policy to increase its revenues from taxes, despite its inadequacy 
to increase tax payers’ compliance (Stella, 1991). This revenue boost is merely derived 
from those wishing benefits from the tax amnesty (Malik & Schwab, 1991), the 
implementation of which will make the taxpayers not compliant due to the hope for the 
subsequent tax amnesty (Bayer, et al., 2015). It should be supported by the law 
enforcement (Alm & Beck, 1993) such as tax audits.  
 
Tax Payment Revenue Ratio 
DGT has issued a policy of audit on taxpayers participating in the tax amnesty when 
they do not declare all their assets. DGT has some methods for determining the 
selected taxpayers. This study suggests an alternative way to determine the selected 
taxpayers to audit after the policy. To determine which taxpayers should be audited, 
DGT, of course, must figure out those underreport taxable assets. It is carried out if 
taxpayers remain aggressively avoid taxes when of the tax amnesty policy is enacted. 
Tax avoidance can be measured by an Effective Tax Rate or ETR (Armstrong, et al., 
2012; Badertscher, et al., 2013; Khan, et al, 2017; Phillips, 2003), Cash Effective Tax 
Rates or Cash ETR (Francis, et al., 2017; Khan et al., 2017; Badertscher et al., 2013; 
Armstrong et al., 2012), Book-Tax Differences (Blaylock, et al., 2012) and others. From 
several measurements of proxy tax avoidance, there is no certain threshold number 
whether a taxpayer is considered to commit tax avoidance or not.  
 
By modifying the existing Cash ETR in the previous papers, this study uses the ratio 
between net cash tax payments and net total revenues or sales in the same year. This 
ratio, also known as Final Income Tax, used by DGT to impose taxes on certain 
income. The researchers call this ratio as the Tax Payment Revenue ratio (TPR ratio). 
Because one of the purposes of tax amnesty is the tax revenue in cash received by the 
government, this study will use tax in cash as an indicator. The Cash ETR stated by 
the previous papers did not provide an explanation whether the tax payments were 
gross tax payment or net tax payment after calculation with tax refunds. In addition to 
calculations in net amounts, that is, tax payments after tax refunds, this paper analyzes 
and offers that TPR ratio can be a tool to determine taxpayers to be audited due to tax 
avoidance risks. 
 
The formula of the final income tax similar with TPR ratio is used to determine taxable 
income for specific industries or taxpayers in Indonesia. For example, 2.5% Sales 
Tax Rate for the real estate industry at the moment every single sale is completed. The 
taxpayers should pay this taxable income regardless of whether the taxpayers are 
 
2 Information of APBN 2017, Directorate General of Budget, Ministry of Finance of the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
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profit or loss. This final income tax makes the taxpayers easy to pay, and reduces the 
risk from correction when audited by DGT. Some of the incomes subject to this final 
income tax are in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Final Income Tax Rates in Indonesia 
 
No. Type of Incomes Final Income Tax Tariff 
1 Revenue from selling of land and/or building 2.5 % 
2 Revenue from renting of land and/or building 10% 
3 Revenues from selling shares in capital market 0.1% 
4 Interest income from saving and deposit in bank in 
Indonesia 
20% 
5 Revenue from construction business (contractor) 2%, 3%, 4% 
 Revenue from construction business (consultant 
and supervisor) 
4%, 6% 
6 Revenu s from small and medium enterprises 
(SME) 
0.5% 
7 Revenue from domestic shipping company 1.8% 
8 Income from lottery prizes 25% 
9 Dividend received by individual taxpayers from 
investment in a domestic company 
10% 
Sources: Income Tax Regulations in Indonesia 
 
Generally, the final income tax rate is no more than 25%, the corporate statute income 
tax rate. However, the tax base for this final income tax comes from gross revenues or 
sales. This final income tax tariff is imposed without regard to where the income comes 
from, either business or capital. Based on this final income tax tariff, this paper studies 
the ratio of income tax payments to revenues or sales for manufacturing companies 
listed in IDX and then analyze the ratio differences of prior to or at the enactment. 
 
Taxpayer fiscal risks includes register risk, filing risk, payment risk, and declaration risk 
(European Commission, 2006). This paper focuses on declaration risk, the risk of 
taxpayers reporting on false tax return. European Commission (2006) explained two 
ways to identify risky taxpayers. These are risk area and group of taxpayers. Risk area 
is related to taxation regulations while group of taxpayers is related to several different 
things, such as business sector. This study comprises both of them; the risk areas 
related to tax amnesty policies, and group of taxpayers related to manufacturing 
industries providing the largest contribution to Indonesia's GDP. 
 
This study finds that the taxpayers have opportunity to avoid tax as the amnesty is 
enacted. This fact is consistent with Malik & Schwab (1991) and  Bayer, et al. (2015) 
explanations. Thus, it is necessary to go for tax audit with TPR ratio used for the 
taxpayer selection. This study suggests that TPR is applicable to identify those with 
significant tax payment reductions despite the company's business activities are 
insignificantly reduced. 
 
This paper consists of research method section explaining the type of research and 
data used. The results and discussion section explains the descriptive statistics of the 
data and discusses the results and what actions possible to take. 
 
 






This paper uses a statistical description of the Tax Payment Revenues ratio (TPR) to 
determine risky taxpayers. TPR is the ratio between total net income tax payments and 
net revenues or sales for the same year. This net income tax payment is derived from 
all income tax payments reduced by tax refund in the same year. This study analyzes 
the descriptive value of TPR of the samples before and when the tax amnesty policy is 
enacted. The changes of the values are used to identify whether the samples 
aggressively avoid taxes or not.  
 
In addition to TPR, the researchers use company’s financial analysis ratio as a 
selected sample with more than 5% changes in the TPR value when the tax amnesty is 
applied. This analysis is carried out to ensure that there is company’s no financial 
problem. However, the tax payments are reduced due to the tax amnesty policy. The 
financial ratios used in this study are gross profit margin, operating income margin, 
income before tax margin, and net income margin. This financial ratio analysis is 
appropriate to understand the company's behavior in investing, and the company's 
policy direction eventually (Astiti, Warmana, & Hidayah, 2019). This paper uses a 5% 
change rate due to its significance. No rule applies that 5% must be used to determine 
a significant change. The researchers use the percentage to determine the level of 
error as in the statistical test for economics. 
 
The data used are manufacturing companies listed on the IDX. The data years are 
2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. Tax amnesty policy has been applied from 2016 until 
2017. Therefore, the data year, prior to the enactment of tax amnesty, is 2014 and 
2015. In addition to random sampling, this study uses the Slovin formula of: 
 






𝑛 = Number of samples 
N = Number of populations 
e     = error margin 
 
With the error margin of 5%, the number of samples obtained was 102 companies. The 
population consists of sub-types of businesses. Table 3 show the total population and 
sample of each sub-type of business. 
 
Table 3: Number of Population and Sample 
No Sub Type of Business Population Samples 
1 Basic Industry And Chemicals 62 46 
2 Miscellaneous Industry 38 28 
3 Consumer Goods Industry 37 28 
 Total 137 102 








RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 shows statistical results from data processing. 
 
Table 4: The Statistics Descriptive of TPR Ratio 
Descriptive 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Mean 0.0238 0.0211 0.0173 0.0176 
Changes  -7.09% -21.95% 1.71% 
Max 0.1155 0.1324 0.1630 0.2213 
Changes  14.64% 23.13% 35.76% 
Min -0.0941 -0.0481 -0.0849 -0.0728 
Changes  -48.94% 76.76% -14.24% 
Median 0.0191 0.0183 0.0106 0.0107 
Changes  -4.19% -41.99% 1.18% 
Std.Deviation 0.0291 0.0267 0.0322 0.0342 
Changes  -8.21% 20.52% 6.18% 
Skewness 0.2806 1.1711 1.1944 2.4276 
Changes  317.41% 1.99% 103.24% 
 
Prior to the enactment of tax amnesty (2015), there was a decrease in the value of the 
TPR mean by 7.09% (from 0.0238 to 0.0211). When the tax amnesty applied in 2016, 
the value of the TPR mean was lower than that before the enactment (0.0173 
compared to 0.0211, and 0.0238). This condition is sound for the value of TPR median 
sharply falling in 2016 and remaining low in 2017 (from 0.0183 to 0.0106 in 2016 and 
to 0.0107 in 2017). Furthermore, the value of TPR std. deviation broadens as tax 
amnesty applied (0.0322 and 0.0342), compared to that prior to enactment (0.0291 and 
0.0267). The increased value of TPR std. deviation illustrates the increasing variation 
in the TPR of the sample when the tax amnesty applied. 
 
With the increasing the value of TPR skewness after tax amnesty (from 1.1711 to 
1.1944 and 2.4276), and supported by the smaller value of TPR mean when tax 
amnesty applied (0.0173 and 0.0176), the majority of this sample implies smaller 
income tax payments compared to sales or revenues. More than half of the samples 
have the TPR value smaller than the value of TPR mean. The maximum value of the 
TPR after the tax amnesty is getting higher, by 0.1630 in 2016 and 0.2213 in 2017. The 
minimum value of the TPR increases prior to the tax amnesty (2015), from -0.0941 to -
0.0481. When the tax amnesty applied, the minimum values of this TPR decreased to -
0.0849 in 2016 and to -0.0728 in 2017. 
 
A decrease in the value of the TPR mean illustrates the existence of tax avoidance 
schema by the taxpayers in this sample. Indonesia’s Tax Amnesty requires taxpayers 
to pay tax penalty by reporting assets that have not been reported. Assuming a 
company with normal condition, obviously the value of TPR increases due to the 
increasing of tax payment. This implies the majority of the taxpayers benefit the tax 
amnesty policy as a moment to make tax avoidance schema. It means that the 
taxpayers in manufacture industry face fiscal risk due to the tax avoidance schema.  
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The existence of tax avoidance is also supported by the smaller value of TPR median 
or shifting to a lower level (from 0.0191 and 0.0183 to 0.0106 and to 0.0107). The 
average value of TPR median before tax amnesty was 0.0187 and dropped to an 
average of 0.01065 when the tax amnesty applied. This decrease is 43% and quite 
significant. The widening value of TPR std. deviation and the greater value of TPR 
skewness draw to a conclusion that most of the taxpayers in this sample undertook the 
tax avoidance scheme. It implies that most of the samples do tax planning to reduce 
tax payment. 
 
TPR is beneficial to identify some companies in manufacturing industry making tax 
avoidance scheme aggressively as the change of the TPR mean value implies. The 
companies with aggressive tax avoidance indication are highly open for further analysis 
using financial ratio. This study takes one company with small TPR as a sample for the 
next discussion, the data of which are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Ratios of a sample 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Tax Payment Ratio (TPR) 0.0173 0.0189 0.0077 0.0078 
   Changes  9.61% -59.12% 0.58% 
Gross Profit Margin 0.5164 0.5072 0.5180 0.5389 
   Changes  -1.78% 2.13% 4.03% 
Operating Income Margin 0.0861 0.0727 0.0863 0.0826 
   Changes  -15.60% 18.68% -4.22% 
Income Before Income Tax Margin 0.0718 0.0660 0.0694 0.0627 
   Changes  -8.18% 5.27% -9.65% 
Net Income Margin 0.0537 0.0490 0.0630 0.0470 
   Changes  -8.66% 28.55% -25.51% 
 
Table 5 presents the ratios of a company as samples in this paper. This company is 
referred to as X corp. The reason for taking this company data is that this company's 
TPR value is smaller than TPR mean of the data year. The average of X Corp’s TPR 
before tax amnesty is 0.0181 and 0.0078 when the tax amnesty is applied. The 
average value has declined by 57.13%. This indicates that this company does tax 
planning to reduce tax payable. 
 
Data of gross profit margin shows that there is an increase in profits from the 
company's gross profit because the value of gross profit margin increased (0.52 in 
2016 and 0.54 in 2017 compared to 0.51 in 2015). The average values of gross profit 
margin before tax amnesty enactment was 0.512 and when the tax amnesty applied 
was 0.528. There is an increasing average value of gross profit margin by 3.25% in the 
year tax amnesty enactment compared to that prior enactment. It could imply that the 
company is economical in using raw materials within the country and sells its products 
domestically. 
 
In general, the average value of operating income margin does not much differ 
between before and when the tax amnesty applied. The average value of operating 
income margin before tax amnesty is 0.0794 (average of 0.0861 and 0.0727) and when 
tax amnesty was enacted is 0.0844 (average of 0.0863 and 0.0826). There is an 
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increase of 6.35% on this average value. It suggests that this company saves the 
operational expenses. 
 
The average value of income before income tax margin and amnesty is 0.0689 
(average of 0.0718 and 0.0660) and when tax amnesty was enacted is 0.0661 
(average of 0.0694 and 0.0627). There is a decrease of 4.09% on Income Before 
Income Tax Margin average. Other expenses reducing operating profit are possibly 
estimated. 
 
The average value of net income margin before tax amnesty is 0.0514 (average of 
0.0537 and 0.0490) and when tax amnesty was enacted is 0.0550 (average of 0.0630 
and 0.0470). There is an increase in the average net income margin by 7.07%. It is 
estimated that there are savings on income tax paid. 
 
These ratios explain that the taxpayer could increase the income for 2 years when 
applying tax amnesty compared to that before tax amnesty. This mainly comes from 
operating income by 6% at least. This is not accompanied by an increase in tax 
payments as measured by the TPR. The decreased average value of TPR by 57.13% 
indicates that this company is doing aggressive tax planning to reduce tax payments. 
Another proof is the average of net income margin when the tax amnesty applied has 
increased by 7.07% higher than that before tax amnesty. It needs further investigation 
whether this tax planning is in accordance with tax regulations or not. If it is doubtful or 
indications for illegal tax avoidance occur, an audit is open to schedule. 
 
This analysis result could be supporting data for DGT to mitigate the risk of doing law 
enforcement against the guilty taxpayers. X Corp certainly carries out aggressive tax 
avoidance, however, needs an audit is needed to ascertain whether the tax avoidance 
is legal or illegal. The results of this discussion explain that the TPR ratio can be used 
as an analytical tool for DGT in determining taxpayers’ avoidance. These results 
provide an opportunity for DGT to reduce errors in determining the taxpayers. This 
method is highly applicable if the employees in DGT receive suitable trainings 
(Kwiatek, 2018). As to taxpayers, this TPR ratio may measure the aggressiveness of 
tax planning strategy. Extremely aggressive tax planning may bad effects on the 
company, such as a decrease in the value of the company (Chen, Hu, & Wang, 2014).  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The tax amnesty policy adopted in Indonesia is intended to increase government 
revenues from the tax sector as well as to increase the level of taxpayer compliance in 
the future. When the tax amnesty introduced in 2016 and 2017, there was an increase 
in tax revenues in rupiah, however it was not concurrent with the increase in taxpayer 
compliance as the tax ratio measured. To increase the effectiveness in implementing 
policy, further regulations for law enforcement are needed (Alm & Beck, 1993), one of 
which is by conducting a tax audit. In fact, Indonesia’s tax authority in has made this 
tax audit policy. This paper provides suggestions for determining taxpayers with criteria 
specific to the audit.  
 
This study introduces the concept of TPR, the ratio of net income tax payments to net 
sales or revenues in the same year. Actually, this concept is used in Indonesia’s tax 
regulations for final income tax imposition. Data from manufacturing companies listed 
on the IDX expose a decrease in of TPR mean and median when the tax amnesty was 
enacted. Those with lower TPR value than the TPR mean, either before or on the tax 
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amnesty application, implies that they generate an increase in operating income, 
however their TPR was significantly decreased. They are suggested to become 
taxpayers with fiscal risk demanding for tax auditing. 
 
TPR ratio can be brought to determine certain audited taxpayers for their aggressive 
tax avoidance, despite its weakness, not suitable for taxpayers subject to final taxation. 
There is a method similarity between the TPR ratio and the final taxation. This study 
uses manufacturing company data solely and compares them before and when the 
amnesty was applied. It is recommended to conduct further research with different data 
and conditions, for example without the influence of tax amnesty policies. This possibly 
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